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Hoover, the Red
Cross and Food
for the Hungry*
C. Roger Lambert
FOOD FOR HUNGRY AMERICANS BECAME ONE OF THE MOST
controversial issues of the Depression years of the Herbert
Hoover presidency. As reports of malnutrition and starvation
became more insistent, humanitarians began to demand federal
food programs. Hoover's philosophy of local responsibility and
self-help, and his belief that no one actually was starving,
countered that demand. Since the president opposed federal in-
volvement in direct relief to individuals, he called upon the Red
Cross to perform what many considered ought to be government
functions. By 1932 the food issue had had major effects on both
the Red Cross and Hoover. The charity organization had
assumed new responsibilities for general Depression relief, and
the president had misused opportunities and thereby forfeited
his role as the greatest international humanitarian.
Hoover's position on relief was based on his view of the De-
pression, and was reinforced by his idealistic philosophy. He
argued that individual dependence upon the central government
would sap the moral and spiritual fiber of the nation and would
inevitably lead to decay and destruction. He opposed "any
direct or indirect dole. . . . For our people are providing against
distress from unemployment in true American fashion by a
*A version of this paper was read at the Northern Great Plains History Conference in Octo-
ber, 1973, Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Grants from the Research Committee, Arkansas State
University, and The Eleanor Roosevelt Institute permitted research on this topic.
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magnificent response to public appeal and by action of the local
government . . ."' The local charity organizations Hoover con-
tended, must assume the responsibility for relief, aided and
supported by local government.
The Red Cross policies and attitudes were consistent with
Hoover's. John Barton Payne, chairman, declared that unem-
ployment relief "is a local problem, pure and simple. . . ."
"There is," he insisted, "no possible reason why the Federal
government should be called up." Yet the Red Cross was not
anxious to get involved in the gradual-creeping natural disasters
brought by prolonged drought, and it emphasized that its in-
volvement in feeding hungry Americans or aiding Depression
sufferers would drain money and effort from those charity
agencies supposed to do that work.^ Just as Hoover wanted to
disassociate the national government from relief efforts, so did
the Red Cross try to disavow responsibility to Depression vic-
tims.
The federal role in meeting unemplojmient problems called
for voluntary action by individuals, employers and charity orga-
nizations. Hoover pledged, but left partially unfulfilled, a major
expansion in public works. As an inspirational act, he estab-
lished an emergency Committee for Employment, which was fol-
lowed in August 1931 by "The President's Organization on
Unemployment Relief," headed by Walter S. Gifford, president
of American Telephone and Telegraph.' Sometime later, in test-
'Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I. Susman, editors, Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of
American Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing, 1973); Gary H. Koerselman,
Herbert Hoover and the Farm Crisis of the Twenties (Unpublished PHD Dissertation. Northern
Illinois University, 1971); Albert Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance; Hoover, the Nation, the
Depression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); Murray N. Rothbard, America s Great
Depression (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1963); Jordan Scharz, The Interregum of Despair:
Hoover Congress and the Depression (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970); Harold M.
Hyman, editor, Herbert Hoover at the Onset of the Great Depression. 1929-1930 (New York:
J. D. Lippincott Company, 1975); Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Forgotten Progressive
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975); Josephine Chapin Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1940).
'Ibid. : Undated Statement by Judge John Barton Payne on the Refusal of the Red Cross to
accept a federal grant. File l-E/113, HPL; De Witt Smith to James L. Fieser, September 20,
1930, File l-E/113; The American National Red Cross in the Unemployment Situation, Con-
fidential Memo, February 25, 1932, File l-E/62, HPL; Foster Rea Dulles, The American Red
Cross: A History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 277, 283-284; New York Times. July
30, 1931.
'Harry L. Hopkins, Spending to Save: the Complete Story of Relief (t^ew York: W. W. Nor-
ton, 1936), 43.
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imony before a Senate committee, Gifford clearly explained the
work of his organization and the attitude of the administration
toward relief:
The Central organization in Washington—my organization—was not to
do anything other than to encourage the states to do the work; in other
words, the responsibility was to be left squarely with the states, counties,
and communities."
The phrase "not to do anything" meant that the organization
made little effort to determine the number of needy. Nor did it
determine how adequately the "states, counties, and commu-
nities" were meeting the need. Congressional hearings, the
newspapers, and reports by relief representatives and health
authorities made it clear that local and voluntary agencies could
not meet the relief load. President Hoover, however, remained
adamant in his opposition to federal involvement. When
pressed, he declared that if federal aid became the "only alter-
native to starvation" then he would support it. But, he pro-
claimed, "I have faith in the American people that such a day
shall not come," and he never accepted the fact that it had.^
Hoover refuted the claims of food shortages:
The evidence of the Public Health Service shows an actual decrease of
sickness and infant and general mortality below normal years. No greater
proof could be adduced that our people have been protected from hunger
and cold and that the sense of social responsibility in the Nation has re-
sponded to the need of the unfortunate."
The administration urged donations to voluntary agencies,
expected local government to act, and looked for various
methods of individual initiative to meet the relief needs. Al-
though charity organizations and some state and local govern-
ments made efforts to aid the needy, the results were woefully
inadequate. Individual efforts to aid the needy ranged from the
heart warming to the absurd. A few people shared their already
'Ibid,, 63.
'Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mif-
flin Company, 1957), 170; Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great De-
pression 1929-1941 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 56.
'Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: TheFunctions of Public
Welfare (New York: Random House, 1971), 54; George McLeod to Senator David Reed, Janu-
ary 4. 1932, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
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Formal portrait, photographed by Fabian Bachrach, for use on the dust
jacket of The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (.Macmillan.)
inadequate food with those less fortunate. School teachers,
underpaid and at times unpaid, established lunch programs for
their students.
Depression adversities were aggravated by drought in many
sections of the nation. In Arkansas hunger and want shifted
attention from general unemployment to more specific problems
induced by weather. In August 1930, widespread reports of
hungry people and farm animals came from Arkansas and
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much of the trans-Mississippi west. Congressmen pushed fed-
eral food and feed programs. Tbe administration, after appar-
ently contradicting itself, supported feed assistance for animals
but opposed any federal food program,' Arthur M. Hyde, Secre-
tary of Agriculture, warned that feeding hungry people "would
constitute a dangerous step toward the dole system in this coun-
try." It might thus establish a precedent for feeding the millions
of unemployed in the cities."
The issue led to a major fight over relief priorities between
Congress and tbe president. While Arkansas representative Till-
man Parks was charging that the "Administration would feed
Jackasses, but it wouldn't feed starving babies," the efforts
to force either a food program for drought victims or for all hun-
gry Americans continued through, tbe winter of 1930-31.'
Arkansas congressmen first sought to secure a federal appro-
priation of twenty million for food loans to hungry drought vic-
tims. Administration opposition and the desire of urban liberals
to extend this to the city unemployed prevented its passage in
Congress.
Hoover wanted the Red Cross to provide relief—including
food for the hungry—in the drought areas. He felt this was the
proper form of relief because it would permit that great spiritual
outpouring of tbe haves to tbe haye-nots. When it was clear that
direct food assistance had been blocked, Arkansas Senator Joe
T. Robinson led a movement to grant the Red Cross twenty-five
million which could be used for both drought and urban relief.
Tbe president opposed and John Barton Payne, chairman ofthe
Red Cross, refused tbe grant because "the welfare of tbe Red
Cross and those it is now helping and will belp in tbe future re-
quire that it continue its bistoric voluntary role and refuse to be
drawn into politics." Althougb tbe Red Cross bad used public
funds in earlier crises, tbis killed the grant movement.'"
Senator T. H. Caraway of Arkansas charged tbat Hoover
was using tbe relief organization as "a political screen" to cover
bis opposition to food assistance and pushed still anotber fed-
'Roger Lambert, "Hoover and the Red Cross in the Arkansas Drought of 1930," Arkansas
Historical Quarterly, 29 (Spring 1970), 7-8.
"Hopkins, Spending to Save, 33.
'Lambert, "Hoover and the Red Cross," 8-16.
'"Ibid.. 15-16.
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eral loan measure. As the relief problem in Arkansas proved far
greater than the administration had anticipated, as criticism of
the Red Cross appeared, and as political pressures increased.
Congress reached a compromise. A twenty million dollar appro-
priation was added to the earlier feed and seed loan, and it was
understood that it could be used for food. Although the money
would go to the planters and landlords instead of the hungry
croppers and tenants, the measure was quite satisfactory to the
Arkansas representatives. The final relief legislation was almost
identical to the one which Arkansans had proposed three months
earlier. All that Hoover had accomplished in his months of
opposition was to build a reputation for being tight, hard-
hearted and anti-relief." More important, perhaps, he misused
an opportunity for strong, effective leadership in meeting the
nation's relief needs. By denying federal responsibility and em-
phasizing voluntary—that is. Red Cross—action Hoover for-
feited the mantle of humanitarian concern to the Democrats.
Unemployment or Depression relief remained a difficult
mafter for the Red Cross to resolve. Since the the problem ori-
ginated out of economic failure, the Red Cross policy was to
leave to local government and other charity organizations all
provisions of assistance for the unemployed. James L. Fieser,
vice-chairman of the Red Cross, said "unemployment relief was
also definitely outside the Red Cross field," and he considered it
a "menace to the future of the Red Cross to become involved in
the unemployment question." Red Cross officials argued that
such involvement would mean entanglements in politics and de-
privation of voluntary funds for local charity organizations.'^
Bitter criticism was leveled at the Red Cross in 1932. Al-
though somewhat extreme, the view expressed by John L. Lewis
was not unique.
The only thing that apparently inspires the Red Cross to extend assis-
tance is a conflagration, flood, pestilence, and war. It doesn't make any
difference to them how many people die of starvation, how many children
suffer from malnutrition or how many women are weakened. . ."
"Ibid., 15.
"The American National Red Cross in the Unemployment Situation, Confidential Memo,
February 25, 1932, File l-E/62, HPL; Dulles, The American Red Cross, 283-284.
"New York Times, January 5, 1932.
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The Red Cross was in the process of broadening its services.
In 1931 drought relief and cooperation with other charity orga-
nizations to provide unemployment relief would be undertaken
with less reluctance than that demonstrated in the Arkansas
drought of 1930. In 1932 the Red Cross was almost eager to
assume a broader relief responsibility and some officials seemed
to assume that the organization would soon take on a broad un-
employment relief role.
The question of Federal Farm Board wheat and unemploy-
ment relief demonstrated even more clearly the lost chances of
the Hoover administration and the increasingly larger role
played by the Red Cross.^'' The Farm Board, created in 1929,
sought to maintain farm prosperity by providing for the pur-
chase of vast quantities of wheat and cotton. As it soon became
clear that there was little chance of traditional market disposal
of the wheat, the idea of using these surplus supplies for relief
purposes appeared early in 1930. The public expressed fears
that the government might dump the wheat in the ocean or de-
stroy it in some similar way. E. W. Brickert, a "Christian Minis-
ter and Farmer" and a Republican of Delaware, warned the
president against such a "sinful and foolish" idea and suggested
that the wheat be given to the "great army of the unemployed,
who can NOT buy wheat, or fiour."^^ This idea, with innumer-
able variations, appeared again and again during the next two
years. The best developed plan for use of government wheat
came in the fall of 1930 from J. R. McCleskey, Executive Direc-
tor of the Economic Conservation Committee of America, and
William Gibbs McAdoo. The plan called for a three-man com-
mission which would supervise the distribution of the wheat
through the Red Cross and other philanthropic organizations."
McCleskey contacted Hoover and members of the cabinet
and urged the administration to adopt the program. He warned
'"The Federal Farm Board was part of the Hoover solution to the farm problem. Hoover be-
lieved that "voluntary cooperation" was the only way to solve the farm price, surplus production
problem without destroying the individualism of the farmer. The Farm Board was to encourage
and aid cooperatives and, in emergency, create stabilization efforts, including the purchase of
low priced surpluses. James L. Fieser to John Barton Payne, May 19, 1932, File l-E/62, HPL.
"E. W. Brickert to Lawrence Ritchey, March 27, 1930, File L-E/160, HPL.
"W. G. McAdoo to Joe T. Robinson, November 30, 1930; J. R. McCleskey to Ray Lyman
Wilbur, December 8, 1930, File l-E/161, HPL; J. R. McCleskey to Herbert Hoover, December
5, 1930, File l-E/161, HPL.
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Hoover that "the desperation born of hunger breeds a mental
attitude which cannot be permitted to gain a foothold among so
large a mass of our people as are now destitute." He also told
Hoover that "public thought is crystalizing in the full expec-
tancy that the president will do something definite and practical
and immediate to help feed the people who are hungry now.""
Although Alexander Legge, head of the Farm Board, indicated
his willingness to sell—not give—the wheat to charity organiza-
tions, nothing came of these early suggestions."
A novel ideal for the relief use of wheat was proposed by
E. N. Hopkins of the Meredith Publishing Company. He urged
that wheat "be distributed to the worthy poor" through the Red
Cross and Public Welfare Bureau Channels. Hopkins empha-
sized the necessity of feeding "starving humanity" and sug-
gested that Hoover could not only gain credit but also "stabilize
farm prices and . . . stop the mouths of thousands of people
who are criticizing the government. . . . " "
Congress took up the wheat question in the winter of 1931-
32. Again the Farm Board emphasized that it must be paid for
the wheat and President Hoover was understood to oppose the
measure. The Senate adopted the plan; the House at first re-
fused, but then approved the donation of wheat to the Red Cross
for distribution to the needy with no restriction on natural or
economic origins.^" The president, it was understood, still
opposed the measure but would sign the bill. He did not con-
sider this a dole since the government would be distributing a
commodity rather than cash.^' The Farm Board still insisted
that it should be paid for the wheat. The Red Cross remained
hesitant, emphasized the difficulties and dangers of the pro-
gram, but pledged to do its duty." In the next eleven months.
"Ibid,: J. R. McCleskey to Herbert Hoover, December 5, 1930, FUe L-E/161.
"Clipping, Chicago Evening Post, October 23, 1930, File l-E/161, HPL. Apparently
Colonel Arthur Woods, head of the Committee on Employment, did not support the idea.
Isaac Sprague to Theodore Roosevelt, July 22, 1933; Joseph M. Rothschild to Herbert Hoover,
July 21, 1931; J. W. Krueger to Edgar Rickard, August 7, 1931, FUe l-E/161, HPL.
"E. N. Hopkins to President Hoover, July 27, 1931; Charles D. Reid to E. N. Hopkins,
August 1, 1931, File l-E/161, HPL.
'"New York Times, February 25, March 2, 7, 1932.
"New York Times, January 5, March 6, 8, 1932.
"James Fieser to John Barton Payne, May 19, 1932; Unsigned and undated MilMUKAN-
DUM which discussed at length the problems. File l-E/161, HPL; John Barton Payne to
Charles L. McNary, March 8, 1932, File l-E/161, HPL.
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the Red Cross approved for distribution over eight and one half
million barrels of flour to 5,140,855 families in all but forty-five
of the 3,072 counties of the nation. In addition, over 220,000
tons of stock feed were distributed." The value of the wheat as a
relief item was obvious.
Although Hoover and the Red Cross cooperated in the wheat
distribution, they did so without eagerness. By 1932 it would
have been all but impossible to refuse this most limited relief
effort. Not even one unit of the Chamber of Commerce sup-
ported wheat distribution.^'' Although flour and bread were the
major items in Red Cross Depression relief, by mid-1932 the
organization had moved into the unemplojTnent fleld in a major
way.
The food relief issue had grave effects on President Hoover.
Will Rogers, who helped raise money for the Red Cross, warned
" . . . you let this country get hungry and they are going to eat,
no matter what happens to budgets, income taxes, or Wall
Street values. Washington mustn't forget who rules when it
comes to a showdown." Herbert Hoover forgot. Americans com-
pared the vigorous and big-hearted relief role of Hoover in the
First World War, Russian Civil War and the Mississippi Flood
of 1927 with his opposition, or at best reluctant acquiesence, to
food for hungry Americans during the early Depression years.
Hoover might have seized the initiative in the drought crisis
and food relief issue without seriously violating his faith in
"voluntary cooperation" and his determination to prevent sig-
nificant expansion of the federal bureaucracy. Instead he vigor-
ously opposed direct government food aid and made no real
effort to lead a vast voluntary assistance program. Rather than
lead a great humanitarian drive to help the needy, he permifted
opposition politicians to charge that he would "feed Jackasses
but not starving babies," to coin the terms "Hoover apples" for
turnips, and "Hoover Hogs" for jackrabbits, and to describe the
president as cold and hard hearted. Hoover was not hard
hearted but he was severely limited either in political reality or
by philosophical rigidity or both. As late as January 1932 he sug-
"Report, Red Cross Relief Activities, February 18, 1933, File l-E/62, HPL.
"Mitchell Chamber of Commerce, Carl I. Rolston to the President, February 21, 1932, File
l-E/161, HPL.
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Herbert Hoover at age eighty-three.
gested tbat five or ten million dollars donated "by substantial
men" would see the country tbrougb tbe relief needs ofthe year
"without a breakdown in our fundamental ideas of govern-
ment."" Wbile Hoover forced tbe Red Cross into relief and a
broadened concept of its responsibilities, he continued to place
his faith in an elitist concept of charity. Had tbe president in tbe
fall of 1930 used tbe leadership abilities he demonstrated in tbe
"C . Roger Lambert, "Herbert Hoover and Federal Farm Board Wheat," Heritage of Kan-
sas, 10 (1977): 29-30.
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role of food administrator during World War I and launched a
nation-wide effort to deal with the drought crisis, he might have
stimulated a vast "voluntary cooperation" movement and he
could have fended off much of the political attack that de-
veloped. Instead, he made clear his opposition to the use of any
federal funds or aid for individual relief and appeared not only
reluctant but heartless as Congress forced it upon him."
With millions of bushels of surplus wheat in the control of
the Federal Farm Board, Hoover might have developed a food
program giving him the impetus and political following to have
changed the history of the Depression and of politics for the next
twenty years. The president might have added to the wheat the
concerted and organized drive for voluntary support he demon-
strated in the previous relief efforts and thereby retained his
reputation as the world's greatest humanitarian. Again, he
opposed and gave ground grudgingly and his final reluctant and
half-hearted acceptance of the wheat for relief use was public
knowledge." Instead of building on his reputation of aiding suf-
fering humanity. Hoover forfeited the humanitarian role to the
Democratic Party and with it the political impetus. The food re-
lief issue helped to destroy the Hoover presidency and it paved
the way for the New Deal and a vast array of federal food pro-
grams. Through inaction Hoover helped birth the thing he most
feared—a vast expansion of the federal bureaucracy.^'
"Clearly Hoover called upon private effort in his appeal to the Red Cross and in his call for
donations to the Red Cross. This effort did not receive the best efforts of either president or the
public. It may be that Hoover felt the constraints of office and was unwilling to use the propa-
ganda efforts of the earlier period. Whether it was philosophical restraints, sense of office, an
unvoiced recognition that voluntary contributions could not meet the needs, or an unrecognized
lack of leadership ability is not clear. It is clear that for such a staunch advocate of voluntary
solutions. Hoover made a minimum effort to get voluntary action.
"I t might be argued that Hoover was simply holding to his established principles. This is
kinder than to accuse him of political stupidity, hard heartedness, or even lack of awareness of
the hunger problems in the country. It is equally simplistic and almost certainly inaccurate. To
use federal wheat to feed Americans seems to most less a violation of tradition or "voluntary
effort" than federal aid to business corporations.
"I t is possible even probable that no voluntary program even with the best efforts of the
president, would have made a significant difference in the Depression. Politically a more active
and flexible role by Hoover might have made a great difference.
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